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THE LAW OF ADVERSE POSSESSION IN WASHINGTON
WILUAM B. STOEBUCK*
Adverse possession is an anomaly in the law in that it is a system
whereby a legal right is obtained through conduct which must be
wrongful. Essentially it consists of the nonpermissive occupation of
another's land until a statute of limitations bars his right to recover it.
Unlike the usual statute of limitations situation, in which only a rem-
edy is barred, in adverse possession the occupant acquires an affirma-
tive legal right, an original title in fee simple. Clearly such a strange
and drastic doctrine must spring from strong necessity. Desire to re-
ward the occupant or punish the lax owner should not be the motive,
though some cases smack of this. The doctrine arose in law, not equity;
so estoppel is not the explanation. Rather, it is suggested adverse
possession rests on considerations of public policy: that title to land
should not long be in doubt, that society will benefit from someone's
making use of land the owner leaves idle, and that third persons who
come to regard the occupant as owner may be protected. Of some force
too must be the notion that mere possession, itself a rudimentary right
in land, might metamorphose into a more formal right if long continued.
Modem adverse possession is the successor to disseisin at common
law, and it is common to refer to the adverse possessor as "disseisor"
and the dispossessed owner as "disseisee." Though seisin originally
meant only possession,' by sometime before the reign of Henry IF it
denoted a tenancy of freehold, carrying with it the incidents of feudal
tenure.8 Not until the eighteenth century was seisin thought of
as an abstract right of ownership in the modem sense of "title."'
A disseisin was a wrongful putting out of seisin, not merely a dispos-
sessing, which might be rightful,' and implied both an entry and an
ouster from the freehold.' It is generally said that a disseisin, no mat-
ter how long continued, could not give title,7 which is not surprising,
considering that seisin was not abstract title. However, the common
* Lawyer; member, Washington Bar.
'HOLDSWORTH, AN HiT.oicAL INTRODUCTION To THE LAND LAW 21 (1927); 2
POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 29 (1898).
21154-1189 A.D. See Taylor dem Atkyns v. Horde, 1 Burr. 60 (1757).
812 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 29-40.
4 HOLDSWORTH, Op cit. supra note 1, at 128.
5 CoKE UPON LITTLETON, 153 b., n. 7.
6 Id. at 181 a.
7 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Op. cd. supra note 1, at 81.
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law had limitation periods on all the actions for recovery of land, and,
due to the nature of seisin, the barring of the right of the only one who
could defeat the disseisor gave the latter a title of sorts.8 Moreover,
it appears that, although the disseisor might not be seised in his own
right, he could convey seisin.'
The English statutes of limitation varied a number of times through
several centuries until the period for bringing all actions to recover
land was set at twenty years in 1623."0 This was the statute in effect
at the time of the American Revolution, and its twenty-year period is
what American cases refer to as the common-law period. "1 The term
"adverse possession" seems to have been first used in 1757 in the case
of Taylor dem. Atkyns v. Horde."
In Washington every adverse possession case will involve a statute.
This is not to say that the quality of adverse possession is always regu-
lated by statute but rather that the period for which adverse possession
must be maintained to give title is governed by statute. It often simpli-
fies one's thinking to regard adverse possession cases as involving
questions from two separate areas of law: possession of real property
and limitations on actions. Washington has three statutes governing
adverse possession and another providing for the adverse acquisition
of vacant land without possession. In addition, there are two other
minor statutes which, while they are not concerned with adverse pos-
session, are covered here because of a logical connection with that
subject. This article is based upon cases involving the six statutes
alluded to and attempts to cite every Washington case upon them. In
addition, a section has been added on the subject of acquisition of
easements by prescription, though the treatment does not purport to
deal with all Washington cases. No coverage is given to prescriptive
acquisition of water rights. Nor will anything be said concerning chat-
tels except to note that Washington has stated one may get ownership
of another's chattels by "adverse possession" of them for the three-
year period of limitations on replevin. 3
THE STATUTES
Ten-year statute. The principal adverse possession statute is RCW
8 Ibid.
9 Taylor dem. Atkyns v. Horde, 1 Burr. 60, 108 (1757).
10 Stat. 21 Jas. 1, c. 16.
11 BUSIVELL, TEE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION 14 (1889).
12 1 Burr. 60. Bordwell, Seisin and Disseisin, 34 HARV. L. REV. 592, 623 (1921).
13 Edison Oyster Co. v. Pioneer Oyster Co., 22 Wn.2d. 616, 157 P.2d 302 (1945)
Lovell v. Reid, 34 Wn.2d 847, 210 P.2d 803 (1949) (dictum).
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4.16.020,4 which simply provides that all actions for the recovery of
title or possession to real property must be begun within ten years after
the plaintiff was last seised or possessed of it. The first adverse posses-
sion case in the state held the statute was run only by "adverse pos-
session" in the common-law sense, 5 and this has never been doubted
since. The court has numerous times recited definitions of adverse
possession under the ten-year statute, the latest being: "'Possession,
to be adverse, must be actual and uninterrupted, open and notorious,
hostile, and exclusive, and under a claim made in good faith.... 2)216
Usually the court uses "claim of right" instead of merely "claim, 17
and sometimes "claim of right or color of title."1 In one or two cases
the court has even added, apparently for good measure, that adverse
possession must be "adverse," in addition to the other elements. As a
practical matter, however the phrase may vary from case to case, it
should be regarded as only a somewhat redundant definition of "ad-
verse," not as an original statement of law, and the practitioner ought
not be alarmed by minor changes in wording.
Color-of-title statute. Probably the second most important statute
is RCW 7.28.070, which provides that one who has adverse possession
of land for seven successive years under color of title and who pays
all taxes levied on this land during that time, believing in good faith
that he has %good title, becomes the owner of such land as is included
within his colorable title. 9 This statute, setting out. the requirements
14RCW 4.16.020--'The period prescribed in RCW 4.16.010 for the commencement
of actions shall be as follows: Within ten years: Actions for the recovery of the pos-
session thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appears
that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the
premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action."
15 Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497, 499, 30 Pac. 648 (1892): "In our opinion our
statute- of limitations is like that of most of the other states, one of adverse posses-
sion.. .. "
TG Slater v. Murphy, 154 Wash. Dec. 250, 257, 339 P.2d 457 (1959), citing Taylor
v. Talmadge, 45 Wn.2d 144, 273 P.2d 506 (1954), and Scott v. Slater, 42 Wn.2d 366,
255 P.2d 377 (1953).
17 See, for example, Fisher v. Hagstrom, 35 Wn.2d 632, 214 P.2d 654 (1950), or
Bowden-Gazzam Co. v. Hogan, 22 Wn.2d 27, 154 P.2d 285 (1944).
is Examples are Skansi v. Novak, 84 Wash. 39, 146 Pac. 160 (1915), and Hesser v.
Siepmann, 35 Wash. 14, 76 Pac. 295 (1904). No case has required "color of title" under
the ten-year statute, and it seems not to be the current vogue even to recite it as an
alternative to "claim of right"
19 RCW 7.28.070-"Every person in actual, open and notorious possession of lands
or tenements under claim and color of title, made in good faith, and who shall for
seven successive years continue in possession, and shall also during said time pay all
taxes legally assessed on such lands or tenements, shall be held and adjudged to be the
legal owner of said lands or tenements, to the extent and according to the purport of
his or her paper title. All persons holding under such possession, by purchase, devise
or descent, before said seven years shall have expired, and who shall continue such
possession and continue to pay the taxes as aforesaid, so as to complete the possession
and payment of taxes for the term aforesaid, shall be entitled to the benefit of this
section."
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of both the possession and limitations aspects, is a complete expression
of a specialized form of adverse possession. As will appear later, "color
of title," its outstanding feature, is a void paper title.
Connected-title statute. The third statute which can truly be
called one of adverse possession is RCW 7.28.050.20 It provides that
there is a seven-year limitations period on the bringing of any action
to recover land when the same is possessed adversely by one who has
record title running back to a state or federal deed, to a tax sale, or to
a state or federal judicial sale. Thus, the statute requires adverse pos-
session for seven years under such record title and is intended to "vali-
date" such titles if they are void because of some defect in the deed or
sale or the proceedings leading up to them. It will be noted that neither
payment of taxes nor good faith is required by this statute.
Vacant-land statute. RCW 7.28.080 is a curious statute in that it
gives title to land to a person who, in good faith, has color of title to
vacant land and who pays taxes on it for seven successive years, though
he never sets foot upon it." This of course is not an adverse possession
statute at all, since it lacks the basic requirement of possession. How-
ever, because it is a substitute for adverse possession, it must be con-
sidered a logical part of the law on that subject.
Vacation of unopened county roads. A statute having no particu-
lar connection with adverse possession is RCW 36.87.090, providing
that county roads which are not opened for five years after being
20 "That all actions brought for the recovery of any lands, tenements or heredita-
ments of which any person may be possessed by actual, open and notorious possession
for seven successive years, having a connected title in law or equity deducible of
record from this state or the United States, or from any public officer, or other person
authorized by the laws of this state to sell such land for the nonpayment of taxes, or
from any sheriff, marshal or other person authorized to sell such land on execution
or under any order, judgment or decree of any court of record, shall be brought within
seven years next after possession being taken as aforesaid, but when the possessor
shall acquire title after taking such possession, the limitation shall begin to run from
the time of acquiring title."
21 RCW 7.28.080-"Every person having color of title made in good faith to vacant
and unoccupied land, who shall pay all taxes legally assessed thereon for seven succes-
sive years, he or she shall be deemed and adjudged to be the legal owner of said vacant
and unoccupied land to the extent and according to the purport of his or her paper
title. All persons holding under such taxpayer, by purchase, devise or descent, before
said seven years shall have expired, and who shall continue to pay the taxes as afore-
said, so as to complete the payment of said taxes for the term aforesaid, shall be en-
titled to the benefit of this section: Provided, however, If any person having a better
paper title to said vacant and unoccupied land shall, during the said term of seven
years, pay the taxes as assessed on said land for any one or more years of said term
of seven years, then and in that case such taxpayer, his heirs or assigns, shall not be
entitled to the benefit of this section."
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authorized are vacated.22 This statute, however, does not apply to roads
which have been dedicated by plat or deeded to the state or a county,
and it thus has a narrow scope. Before 1909 it did apply to these kinds
of roads;2" so it might have more utility if a road has been authorized
but unopened for five years before 1909. In the case of roads which
were authorized within five years before 1909, the more restrictive
provisions of the present statute apply. Obviously the statute has
limited usefulness to a landowner who wishes to recover the use of a
roadway across his land.
Three-year tax deed statute. A minor statute which will be ad-
verted to only briefly is RCW 4.16.090, limiting the time for bringing
actions to cancel or set aside tax sale deeds to three years after the
issuance of the deed.25 This has no aspect of adverse possession to it
and is mentioned only that it may be compared with the connected-
title statute, supra.
GENERAL CoNsmERATIONS
Quality of title derived from adverse possession. Title to land is
normally the question involved in adverse possession cases, and it is so
well settled in Washington that adverse possession continued for the
period of limitations gives title that no authority need be cited for this
general rule. The title obtained is an original one in fee simple and is
of the same quality as title gotten by deed." Therefore, it cannot be
waived or renounced orally or by acts27 but can be lost or given up
only in the ways title acquired by deed could be,2" which means of
22RCW 36.87.090-"Any county road, or part thereof, which remains unopened for
public use for a period of five years after the order is made or authority granted for
opening it, shall be thereby vacated, and the authority for building it barred by lapse
of time: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any highway, road, street,
alley, or other public place dedicated as such in any plat, whether the land included in
such plat is within or without the limits of an incorporated city or town, or to any
land conveyed by deed to the state or to any county, city or town for highways, roads,
streets, alleys, or other public places."2 3 Turner v. Davisson, 47 Wn2d 375, 287 P2d 726 (1955) ; Lewis v. City of Seattle,
174 Wash. 219, 24 P.2d 427, aff'd o; rehearing, 174 Wash. 226, 27 P.2d 1119 (1933).
24 Gillis v. King County, 42 Wn.2d 373, 255 P.2d 546 (1953).
215 RCW 4.16.090-"Actions to set aside or cancel any deed heretofore or hereafter
issued by any county treasurer after and upon the sale of lands for general, state,
county or municipal taxes, or upon the sale of lands acquired by any county on fore-
closure of general, state, county or municipal taxes, or for the recovery of any lands
so sold, must be brought within three years from and after the date of the issuance
of such treasurer's deed."
26 Mugaas v. Smith, 33 Wn.2d 429, 206 P.2d 332 (1949) ; McInnis v. Day Lumber
Co., 102 Wash. 38, 172 Pac. 844 (1918) ; Sunde v. Hanson, 96 Wash. 221, 164 Pac.
917 (1917).2 7Johnson v. Ingram, 63 Wash. 554, 115 Pac. 1073 (1911).2 8 McInnis v. Day Lumber Co., 102 Wash. 38, 172 Pac. 844 (1918).
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course that it may be conveyed by deed.2" Once adverse possession
title has been perfected, it will support affirmatively an action to quiet
title or eject the disseised record owner."0 Because adverse possession
title is beyond the aegis of the recording acts, the recorded owner's con-
veyance to a bona fide purchaser does not cut off such title, though no
evidence of it appears of record."' This creates a problem for the title
examiner which physical inspection of the land may not always solve,
since the adverse possessor who had once perfected title would not
lose it by merely vacating the land.
Persons who may possess adversely. The interesting case of
Prentice v. How" seems to be the only Washington case involving the
question of whether personal characteristics of the possessor will pre-
vent his possessing adversely. The case holds that an alien, though
unable to own land, might possess it adversely so that his period of
adverse possession would inure to the benefit of a grantee not under this
disability, who thereby acquired title.
The only other class of case to be discussed at this point is that
where the person claiming title by adverse possession has not personally
occupied the land for the full limitation period but must claim through
others purporting to hold through him. This he may do, and the cases
have held that possession may be had through the claimant's tenants"3
or through a contract vendee in possession."
Entities against which adverse possession will not operate. One
may not possess adversely lands owned in any capacity by the United
States Government 6 or by the State of Washington." Before 1903 it
was possible, under the ten-year statute, to hold state lands other than
shorelands or tidelands adversely, but the adoption of a statute" in
that year removed this possibility.
29Johnson v. Conner, 48 Wash. 431, 93 Pac. 914 (1908).
30 Alexander v. Bennett, 91 Wash. 688, 158 Pac. 534 (1916).
81 Mugaas v. Smith, 33 Wn.2d 429, 206 P.2d 332 (1949).
3284 Wash. 136, 146 Pac. 388 (1915).
33 O'Brien v. Schultz, 45 Wn.2d 769, 278 P.2d 322 (1954) ; Foote v. Kearney, 157
Wash. 681, 290 Pac. 226 (1930) ; Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342, 41 Pac. 49 (1895).
34 McAuliff v. Parker, 10 Wash. 141, 38 Pac. 744 (1894).
35 Roediger v. Cullen, 26 Wn.2d 690, 175 P.2d 669 (1946) (no easement by pre-
scription of federal lands) ; Delacey v. Commercial Trust Co., 51 Wash. 542, 99 Pac.
574 (1909).
36 Bowden-Gazzam Co. v. Kent, 22 Wn.2d 41, 154 P.2d 292 (1944) ; State v. Scott,
89 Wash. 63, 154 Pac. 165 (1916) ; State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 Pac. 1035(1913) ; State v. Seattle, 57 Wash. 602, 107 Pac. 827 (1910) ; O'Brien v. Wilson, 51
Wash. 52, 97 Pac. 1115 (1908) (no adverse possession of lands granted state by federal
government as school lands).
3 RCW 4.16.160, which provides in part that "no claim of right predicated upon
the lapse of time shall ever be asserted against the state .... "
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Adverse possession against a city or county is not possible as to lands
it holds in a "governmental capacity," but it has been said adverse
possession is possible as to lands held in a nongovernmental capacity,
though none such has yet been identified for adverse possession pur-
poses. Thus, there can be no adverse possession of a platted public
street" or alley,39 though it is possible to have adverse possession of
a vacated road.4 0 No adverse possession can be had of land a county
holds by virtue of having bought it at its own tax sale4' nor of land it
has acquired under tax foreclosure.4 " A particularly important applica-
tion of the latter rule is that a tax foreclosure will wipe out any rights
gotten by adverse possession, whether or not the full period of limita-
tions has run.," An exception to this is, however, that title gotten by
adverse possession will not be lost if the adverse possessor had in fact
paid taxes on the land foreclosed, but, because of a misdescription in
the tax receipt, had not gotten credit for doing so.'
A very special class of cases is those involving the Northern Pacific
Railway, which are more of academic interest than anything else now.
In 1864 the railway company received a 400-foot-wide right of way by
act of Congress. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. Ely 5 and Northern Pac. Ry.
v. Hasse," Washington held adverse possessors acquired title to por-
tions of these lands. The United States Supreme Court reversed these
cases on the ground that it would contravene the purpose of the grant
from Congress to allow individuals to acquire title to the lands
granted.' In 1904, while the appeals to the Supreme Court were pend-
ing, Congress passed a statute validating conveyances theretofore made
by the railway up to within 100 feet of the center of the line on either
side. The effect of this was that, though reversing Washington in the
Ely and Hasse cases, the Supreme Court did hold that adverse posses-
sors who claimed land up to this 100-foot distance and who had main-
318 Mueller v. City of Seattle, 167 Wash. 67, 8 P2d 994 (1932) ; Vetter v. K. & K.
Timber Co., 124 Wash. 151 213 Pac. 927 (1923) (semble) ; West Seattle v. West
Seattle Land & Investment Co., 38 Wash. 359, 80 Pac. 549 (1905).30Rapp v. Stratton, 41 Wash. 263, 83 Pac. 182 (1905).
40 Tamblin v. Crowley, 99 Wash. 133, 168 Pac. 982 (1917).
4"Gustaveson v. Dwyer, 83 Wash. 303, 145 Pac. 458, aff'g, 78 Wash. 336, 139 Pac.
194 (1915).42 Johnson v. Burgeson, 25 Wn2d 269, 170 P2d 311 (1946).
13 Rushton v. Borden, 29 Wn.2d 831, 190 P.2d 101 (1948).44 Berry v. Pond, 33 Wn2d 560, 206 P2d 506 (1949). As to whether this should be
the rule, see Comment, Security of Tax Foreclosure Titles, Chapter 2, 25 WAsH. L.
REv. 83 (1950).
45 25 Wash. 384, 65 Pac. 555 (1901).
46 28 Wash. 353, 68 Pac. 882 (1902).
47 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Ely, 197 U.S. 1 (1905) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. Hasse, 197
U.S. 9 (1905). These cases were based in part upon Northern Pac. Ry. v. Townsend,
190 U.S. 267 (1903).
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tained their possession for the period of limitations prior to 1904,
acquired title by adverse possession. Several Washington cases since
have adhered to that view.4"
Adverse possession among owners of different interests in same
land. There have been a relatively large number of cases in Washing-
ton involving situations in which one person who had a partial interest
in land claimed adverse possession against a second person who owned
another partial interest, and the principles in this area are fairly well
blocked out. As a general, if perhaps oversimplified, guide, it may be
said that such possession, to be adverse, must be inconsistent with the
second person's maintenance of his particular quality of interest, con-
sidering its peculiar characteristics and relation to the interest of the
adverse possessor.
Among tenants in common, sole possession and collection of rents,
issues and profits by one does not constitute adverse possession against
the other, because it is not inconsistent with their legal relationship and
gives no notice of adverse claim."9 But if one tenant in common conveys
to a stranger, purporting to grant the entire fee, then this is an incon-
sistent act and does allow the grantee to possess adversely by acts
which would constitute adverse possession among strangers." Simi-
larly, if one tenant in common mortgages his interest and there is a
foreclosure sale, the certificate of sale or deed purporting to include the
entire fee, the purchaser at the sale may possess adversely against the
remaining tenant in common in the same manner as against a fee
owner." There is langague in one case, probably amounting to an alter-
nate holding, that one co-tenant's subdivision and sale of part of a
tract, all without consulting with the other co-tenant, would be such an
inconsistent act as to allow adverse possession by the former of parts
of the tract retained." The court speaks in terms of an "ouster" of
the dispossessed co-tenant and of "notice" to him of the inconsistent
48 Northern Pac. Ry v. Spokane, 45 Wash. 229, 88 Pac. 135 (1907) ; Northern Pac.
Ry. v. Tuttle, 89 Wash. 699, 154 Pac. 796 (1916) ; State v. Ballard, 156 Wash. 530,
287 Pac. 27 (1930).
49 McKnight v. Basilides, 19 Wn.2d 391, 143 P.2d 307 (1943) (husband and father
had become tenant in common with children of community property upon wife's death,
occupying one parcel himself and renting another) ; Graves v. Graves, 48 Wash. 664,
94 Pac. 481 (1908) (upon divorce certain community land, not being disposed of by
decree, became held in common, and one ex-spouse had exclusive use and possession).
50 Church v. State, 65 Wash. 50, 117 Pac. 711 (1911) (interest involved was ten-
ancy in common in water rights).
51 Schlarb v. Castaing, 50 Wash. 331, 97 Pac. 289 (1908) ; Cox v. Tompkinson, 39
Wash. 70, 80 Pac. 1005 (1905).
52 Cox v. Tompkinson, supra note 51.
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claim. The above cases are examples of ousters, and they also show
that constructive notice will suffice.
Between vendor and vendee, if the vendee is in possession under
an executory contract of sale, it is probable that he is estopped to
assert adverse possession. The court has twice said this, once in dic-
tum.3 and once in a statement which may or may not be a holding."4
In the case last cited there definitely was a holding that the vendee
in possession could not possess adversely as long as he continued to
perform any of his obligations under the contract, even though he
had refused to pay installments. If, however, the contractual obliga-
tions are performed, then the vendee may commence a period of ad-
verse possession. 5
There seems to be only one case on the issue of adverse possession
by a tenant against his landlord, and it holds there is no adversity in
the tenant's erection of improvements, at least when they are useful in
his use of the land for the purpose for which it was demised. 8 Since
the case does not go on the broad ground that no adverse possession
would be possible in any event, it is probably still open for contention
that a tenant could, by acts wholly inconsistent with his subservient
holding, oust his landlord and commence adverse possession.
The owner of a fee estate cannot possess adversely to an easement
upon his land unless his acts prevent the enjoyment of the easement
rights. For this reason there is no adverse possession against a rail-
road's easement of passage by farming the right of way up to the
tracks."' It has even been held that there is no adverse possession
against an unopened railroad right of way by farming and fencing the
entire area, since this is not inconsistent with the railroad company's
right to put in its line when it becomes ready to do so.5 A unique situ-
ation similar to the railroad cases arose in McCoy v. Lowrie," which
held that, when there is a severance of mineral rights from surface
58 Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764, 31 Pac. 30 (1892), appeal dis-
missed, Dibble v. Bellingham Bay Land Co., 163 U.S. 63 (1896) (dictum because ad-
verse possession was allowed on ground contract was performed and no longer
executory).
54 Nethery v. Olson, 41 Wn.2d 173, 247 P.2d 1011 (1952).55 Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, supra note 53. This caveat should be added:
The vendee-possessor had actually received a deed which was unrecorded and had
been lost.568Bepple v. Reiman, 51 Wn.2d 144, 316 P.2d 452 (1957) (tenant of farm built
machine shed, gasoline tank, and other small improvements).57 Northern Pac. Ry. v. McDonald, 91 Wash. 113, 157 Pac. 222 (1916) ; Northern
Counties Inv. Trust v. Enyard, 24 Wash 366, 64 Pac. 516 (1901).58 Netherlands Am. Mortgage Bank v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber Co., 142 Wash. 204,
252 Pac. 916 (1927).
r, 42 Wn.2d 24, 253 P.2d 415 (1953).
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rights, the owner of the surface does not possess adversely to the owner
of the underground mineral rights by making exclusive use of the
surface.
Application of adverse possession to some special interests and
situations. It is possible to acquire a mining claim by holding and
working it for the ten-year period of limitations and possibly also
under one of the seven-year statutes." And the court has held that one
who floods another's land by maintaining a dam for ten years acquires
the right to continue doing so, though it was not decided if this occurred
by operation of adverse possession or of prescription of an easement.8"
The ten-year statute is the one which applies to the bringing of ac-
tions for constitutional taking or damaging 2 or for ejectment 3 against
a municipal corporation. Likewise, it is the period of limitation for
bringing an action for constitutional taking or damaging against a
public utility corporation having the power of eminent domain.64
If adverse possession is maintained for the statutory period upon
land which is mortgaged, the following have been held to be the rules:
against the mortgagor or his grantee, the adverse possessor acquires
title when the applicable adverse possession period of limitations has
run; but against the mortgagee or his successor, who has no possessory
right, the adverse possessor acquires a defense only upon the running
of the six-year limitations period on the right to foreclose.65
There may be no adverse possession against a remainderman under
either the ten-year or color-of-title statute. 6 Since the reason for this
is that the holder of future interests cannot eject a possessor, the same
rule would presumably apply to reversioners," though Washington
has not so held.
Tacking. "Tacking" is the joining together of successive periods of
possession by two or more adverse possessors, the purpose for doing
so being to fill up the requisite period of limitation when no one pos-
sessor has himself possessed that long. Many, if not most, of the cases
have involved tacking, but in surprisingly few instances have issues
6 0 Newport Mining Co. v. Bead Lake Gold-Copper Mining Co., 110 Wash. 120,
188 Pac. 27 (1920) (the ten-year statute appears to have been the one involved, though
the court's language indicates it would have allowed application of a seven-year
statute).
61 McInnis v. Day Lumber Co., 102 Wash. 38, 172 Pac. 844 (1918).62 Litka v. City of Anacortes, 167 Wash. 259, 9 P.2d 88 (1932).
63 Aylmore v. City of Seattle, 100 Wash. 515, 171 Pac. 659 (1918).
64 Price v. Humptulips Driving Co., 127 Wash. 69, 219 Pac. 871 (1923).
65 Thornely v. Andrews, 40 Wash. 580, 82 Pac. 899 (1905).
66 McDowell v. Beckham, 72 Wash. 224, 130 Pac. 350 (1913).
67 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 452 (1939).
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been formed upon that circumstance. The court is wont to remark,
more or less in passing, that the possessor and his "predecessors," or
some such term, have been in possession, seldom analyzing the relation-
ships that must exist betwen successive possessors for tacking to be
allowed.
In the case of all three of the seven-year statutes, tacking is regulated
by statute. With the color-of-title statute, those possessors connected
by "purchase, devise or descent" may tack.8 The tacking language
applicable to the connected-title statute is "heirs, devisees and as-
signs,""0 and there seem to be no cases amplifying upon these words.
Nor have cases been found interpreting the tacking provisions of the
vacant-land statute, which applies to persons holding under the original
claimant by "purchase, devise or descent."70
There is no tacking statute for the ten-year statute, but there have
been a handful of cases on the subject. The general statement is -that
there is tacking of adverse possession if the successive occupants are
in "privity."' Definitely such persons are in "privity" if there is a
deed running between them purporting to convey the land possessed.72
The result should be the same when the persons are connected by devise
or intestate succession, although no case seems expressly to discuss
and decide the point. Several have, however, allowed tacking where
successive possessors were connected by devise or inheritance,78 and
it is so eminently reasonable that it should be allowed in this situation
that it hardly .seems worth questioning. And there is at least one situa-
tion in which there need be no deed or document at all if there is simply
a passing of possession. This is where, when the original possessor has
used a'strip of land over his neighbor's boundary, usually under the
mistaken impression it was part of his own land, he conveys his own
land by deed and gives possession of both it and the mistaken area
to his grantee. Here any number of cases have held, most of them with-
out discussion of the point, that there is tacking of the periods of ad-
verse possession of the mistaken area.7" Whether the court would take
6aRCW 728.070. Prentice v. How, 84 Wash. 136, 146 Pac. 388 (1915), held that
tacking occurred under the color-of-title statute when the first adverse possessor pur-
ported to convey the lands possessed adversely by quitclaim deed.09 RCW 7.28.060.
70 RCW 728.080.
7 1 aubion v. Elder, 49 Wn2d 300, 301 P.2d 153 (1956).
72 Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342, 41 Pac. 49 (1895).
78 Faubion v. Elder, 49 Wn2d 300, 301 P2d 153 (1956) (successive possessorsjoined by devise) ; Niven v. Sheehan, 46 Wn.2d 152, 278 P.2d 784 (1955) (not clear if
devise or intestate succession involved).
74 Buchanan v. Cassell, 53 Wn.2d 611, 335 P.2d 600 (1959) (court recognized the
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the next step and hold that, where the land possessed adversely is not
used in connection with land owned, there may be tacking by merely
transferring possession, is speculative. Tiffany says this is possible,7"
and, since the Washington court seems to treat the subject of tacking
rather casually, it very well might follow that view.
Tolling. Tolling of all the adverse possession statutes is governed by
statute, with the ten-year statute having far and away the most elab-
orate system. It is tolled by the following occurrences: Absence from
or concealment in the state;7" infancy, insanity, or incarceration;77
war when the owner is an enemy alien;" application of the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Relief Act to the owner;7" and injunction or statutory
prohibition against bringing an action by the owner."s Any of the
above disabilities must exist when the owner's right of action accrues
if he is to avail himself of it.8 If more than one disability exists when
the action accrues, the period of limitations does not run until all are
removed. 2 Death of an owner does not toll the ten-year statute,"3 but
issue and discussed it) ; Faubion v. Eider, 49 Wn.2d 300, 301 P.2d 153 (1956) ; Fisher
v. Hagstrom, 35 Wn2d 632, 214 P.2d 654 (1950) ; Skoog v. Seymour, 29 Wn.2d 355,
187 P.2d 304 (1947); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Concannon, 75 Wash. 591, 135 Pac. 652
(1913), reversed on other grounds, 239 U.S. 382 (1915).
75 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 434-35 (1939).
76 RCW 4.16.180-"If the cause of action shall accrue against any person who is a
non-resident of this state, or who is a resident of this state and shall be out of the
state, or concealed therein, such action may be commenced within the terms herein
respectively limited after the coming, or return of such person into the state, or after
the end of such concealment; and if after such cause of action shall have accrued,
such person shall depart from and reside out of this state, or conceal himself, the
time of his absence or concealment shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the
time limit for the commencement of such action."
77RCW 4.16.190-"If a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter
... be at the time the cause of action accrued either under the age of twenty-one years,
or insane, or imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of
a court for a term less than his natural life, the time of such disability shall not be a
part of the time limited for the commencement of action." [Emphasis added.] N. B.
that the landowner who is under a disability under this statute had the full ten years
after the end of his disability to bring his action to recover the land. McMillan v.
Walker, 48 Wash. 342, 93 Pac. 520 (1908) ; May v. Sutherlin, 41 Wash. 609, 84 Pac.
585 (1906).
78 RCW 4.16.210--"When the enforcement of civil liabilities against a person in
the military service of the United States has been suspended by operation of law, the
period of such suspension shall not be a part of the period limited for the commence-
ment of the action."
79 RCW 4.16.220-"When the enforcement of civil liabilities against a person in
the military service of the United States has been suspended by operation of law, the
period of such suspension shall not be a part of the period limited for the commence-
ment of the action."
80 RCW 4.16.230-"When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction
or a statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition
shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action."
81 RCW 4.16.250.
82 RCW 4.16.260.
s McAuliff v. Parker, 10 Wash. 141, 38 Pac. 744 (1894).
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his representative will have at least one year after his death to com-
mence an action for recovery of the land. 4
Under both the color-of-title and vacant-land statutes, there is tolling
when the owner is an infant or insane, but he must commence an action
to recover his land within three years after the disability ceases."
There are no tolling provisions whatever for the connected-title
statute.8
When the statutes commence to run. Usually there is no special
question of when the various adverse possession statutes commence
to run, and they simply commence when the possessor begins a posses-
sion which meets all the requirements of adversity under the statute
in question."' They will not commence running until the land is owned
by someone against whom they may run, which most often means they
will not run when the land is owned by some level of government
against which adverse possession does not lie or by some person under
a statutory disability. One novel application of this principle is that
there may be no adverse possession begun against a homesteader from
the United States until he has been issued his patent.8
A different problem was involved in several cases which followed the
lowering in 1881 of the period of limitations of the general adverse
possession statute from twenty years to the present ten years. In sev-
eral cases it was held that the new statute did not relate back to the
beginning of an adverse possession period begun before its passage,
though it would apply to such continuing adverse possession from 1881
on. 9 These cases would presumably be called into service if one of
the present limitation periods should be changed.
Procedural aspects. As has already been stated, an adverse posses-
sor who has thereby perfected title affirmatively asserts it as plain-
tiff in an action, which may be either one of ejectment or to quiet title.
It is sufficient to allow him to offer proof of his perfection of title by
84 RCW 4.16200-"If a person entitled to bring an action dies before the expiration
of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives,
an action may be commenced by his representatives after the expiration of the time
and within one year from his death.'
85 RCW 7.28.090.86 Schlarb v. Castaing, 50 Wash. 331, 97 Pac. 289 (1908) (held that minors have
no disability under connected-title statute).8 7 Thus, under the connected-title statute, there cannot be any running of the statute
until the possessor has both taken possession and has obtained a colorable title trace-
able of record to the state or the federal government Krutz v. Isaacs, 25 Wash. 566,
66 Pac. 141 (1901).88 Slaght v. Northern Pac. Ry., 39 Wash. 576, 81 Pac. 1062 (1905)
89 Tacoma Bldg. & Sav. Ass'n v. Clark, 8 Wash. 289, 36 Pac. 135 (1894) ; Raymond
v. Morrison, 9 Wash. 156, 37 Pac. 318 (1894) ; Baer v. Choir, 7 Wash. 631, 32 Pac.
776 (1893) ; Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23, 34 Pac. 199 (1893).
19601
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
adverse possession under the ten-year statute to allege in his complaint
that he has title" or that he is the owner in fee.9 ' On trial he must
offer proof, not only to show he had possession, but also to show that
it was adverse to the true owner if the defendant shows record title."
Under the color-of-title statute, the plaintiff claiming title by adverse
possession must plead that his possession was under color of title and
in good faith," though apparently it is a sufficient pleading of color
of title to plead holding under a deed.' From this it would seem that
the plaintiff claiming adverse possession title under the connected-title
statute, the color-of-title statute, or the vacant land statute should
plead the special elements of adversity set out in those statutes.
When the plaintiff is the record owner claiming against an adverse
possessor, he too may bring either an action of ejectment or quiet title.99
In a quiet title action, the record owner may properly join as defend-
ants both those claiming adversely to him who are in possession and
those out of possession.90 He sufficiently pleads his title if he alleges
he was once seised, since there is a presumption seisin continues, and
he need not anticipate the defense of adverse possession by pleading
seisin within the last ten years.9 Similarly, an allegation that the
record owner is entitled to possession is sufficient.99 Upon trial the
record-title plaintiff must prove his own title or prior possession and
cannot, if he fails to do so, rely upon weaknesses in the adverse pos-
session defendant's defense to do it for him.99 However, once such a
plaintiff has proven his record title, the burden shifts to the defendant
to show it was extinguished by adverse possession.'
Miscellaneous aspects. An interesting, if little-used, substitute for
adverse possession may lie in a theory of estoppel. In Moore v. Brown-
field,' an 1894 case, it was held that where a landowner had invited
another to settle on his land and the other, relying upon this invitation,
had done so and had made improvements, the owner was estopped to
90 Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 122 Wash. 514, 210 Pac. 770 (1922).
91 Rogers v. Miller, 13 Wash. 82, 42 Pac. 525 (1895).
92 Schmitz v. Klee, 103 Wash. 9, 173 Pac. 1026 (1918) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. Smith,
68 Wash. 269, 122 Pac. 1057 (1912).
93 In re Schnoor's Estate, 31 Wn.2d 565, 198 P.2d 184 (1948).
94 Jones v. Herrick, 35 Wash. 434, 77 Pac. 798 (1904).
95 Carlson v. Curren, 48 Wash. 249, 93 Pac. 315 (1908). Both ejectment and quiet
title actions are plentiful.
96 Ibid.
97 Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497, 30 Pac. 648 (1892).
98 Wilkeson v. Miller, 63 Wash. 680, 116 Pac. 268 (1911).
99 Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co. v. Pacific Iron & Steel Works, 48 Wash. 574,
94 Pac. 110 (1908).
100 Santmeyer v. Clemmancs, 147 Wash. 354, 266 Pac. 148 (1928).
101 10 Wash. 439, 39 Pac. 113 (1894).
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recover possession. However, in a later case"°2 estoppel of a city to
remove a garage the plaintiff had built several years before on a city
street was not allowed, despite the fact that the city had mistakenly
given a permit for the building. The court said that, since the city had
no power to grant such a permit, it could not be estopped from assert-
ing the inefficacy of the permit.
In one case, in which the adverse possessor had used a strip of his
neighbor's land varying in width from one-fourth to seven-tenths of a
foot, he attempted to defeat the neighbor's action for recovery on the
novel theory that the rule de minimis would prevent recovery of such
a small area. In allowing recovery, the court stated it was "extremely
doubtful" that the rule de minimis applied at all to actions to recover
land.103
The remainder of this article will be devoted to a discussion of the
elements of adverse possession required under the ten-year, color-of-
title, connected-title, and vacant-land statutes.
ACTUAL POSSESSION
Legal principles. Possession is of course an element under all the
adverse possession statutes under consideration here except for the
vacant-land statute. The broadest principle in this area is that the
possession must be of such a character as a true owner would make,
considering the nature and location of the particular land in question.'0,
This principle or test savors of the very essence of adverse possession
and seems subject only to this limitation: The adverse possessor must
at all events have some sort of physical occupation of the land, either
by personally staying on the land, having it occupied by those claiming
under him, or by putting on it objects of a kind that an owner would
put on such land.?'0 Therefore, merely paying taxes upon another's
land is not possession of it,' nor is the filing of a plat showing boun-
102 Mueller v. City of Seattle, 167 Wash. 67, 8 P.2d 994 (1932).
103 Wells v. Parks, 148 Wash. 328, 268 Pac. 889 (1928).
10 4 Young v. Newbro, 32 Wn.2d 141, 200 P.2d 975 (1948) ; Bowden-Gazzam Co. v.
Hogan, 22 Wn2d 27, 154 P.2d 285 (1944) ; Grays Harbor Commercial Co. v. McCul-
loch, 113 Wash. 203, 193 Pac. 709 (1920) ; Rogers v. Miller, 13 Wash. 82, 42 Pac. 525(1895) ; Bellingham Bay Land Co. v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764, 31 Pac. 30 (1892), app.
dis-nissed, Dibble v. Bellingham Bay Land Co., 163 U.S. 63 (1896).
205 Snively v. State, 167 Wash. 385, 9 P.2d 773 (1932) (state did not occupy bed
of nonnavigable lake by making claim that lake was navigable and that state therefore
owned bed) ; Cartright v. Hamilton, 111 Wash. 685, 191 Pac. 797 (1920) (no posses-
sion when claimant did not use up to neighbor's fence, which was over on neighbor's
side of boundary line).
00 Loose v. Locke, 25 Wn2d 599, 171 P.2d 849 (1946) ; Austrian American Bene-
volent Cemetery Ass'n v. Desrochers, 124 Wash. 179, 214 Pac. 3, aff'd on rehearing,
124 Wash. 184, 216 Pac. 891 (1923).
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daries overlapping another's land, °7 nor bringing a suit to contest
another's ownership of land," 8 nor even giving another person actual
notice that an adverse claim is made.'00 Possession is not proven merely
by showing that the claimant was generally reputed in the community
to be the owner of certain land."0 An intermittent trespass does not
constitute possession."' And it seems that a person, though he actually
resides on land, might not "possess" it, as would seem to be the situa-
tion where a child lives at home with his parents on the land."'
One fairly important question of which there may yet be some doubt
concerns the possession of wild, remote land, such as timber or moun-
tain land. Some early cases seem to hold that, with timber land, paying
taxes upon it, cutting and selling timber from it, and having the repu-
tation of owning it would be sufficient "acts of ownership" to be posses-
sion."' Two later cases, though not involving the same kind of land
as the earlier ones, seem to lean away from them in principle. Murray
v. Bousquet,"I which is of particular interest, holds that there is no
adverse possession of land in a high and uninhabited mountain valley
by partially fencing it and using it for grazing horses, even though that
is the sort of use a true owner would make of such land. In the other
case" 5 the court said there had to be some form of occupation of un-
occupied and logged-off land, though the holding on the facts is only
that paying taxes alone was not possession of such land. So perhaps it
should not be stated dogmatically that the earlier cases are no longer
good law; however, this appears more likely than not to be so.
A question as to which the theory seems fairly clear concerns the
extent to which a person who admittedly has put physical objects upon
part of another's land may possess around those objects. Perhaps the
best general statement of the rule here is that the possessor possesses
such an additional area around the objects as is "reasonably needed
to carry out his objective.""' It seems that an adverse possessor who
107 Ferry v. Hodson, 22 Wn.2d 613, 156 P.2d 913 (1945).
108 Ibid.
109 Booten v. Peterson, 34 Wn.2d 563, 209 P.2d 349 (1949).
110 McInerney v. Beck, 10 Wash. 515, 39 Pac. 130 (1895).
I"' Downie v. City of Renton, 167 Wash. 374, 9 P.2d 372, reversing 162 Wash. 181,
298 Pac. 454 (1932) (trespass consisted of discharging water across another's land
for two and one-half hours once a year).
112 Calhoun v. Nelson, 47 Wash. 617, 92 Pac. 448 (1907).
113 Rogers v. Miller, 13 Wash. 82, 42 Pac. 525 (1895) ; Bellingham Bay Land Co.
v. Dibble, 4 Wash. 764, 31 Pac. 30 (1892), app. dismissed, Dibble v. Bellingham Bay
Land Co., 163 U.S. 63 (1896).
114 154 Wash. 42, 280 Pac. 935 (1929).
115 Waldrip v. Olympia Oyster Co., 40 Wn.2d 469, 244 P.2d 273 (1952).
116 State v. Stockdale, 34 Wn.2d 857, 210 P.2d 686 (1949). This case, which merits
more attention than it has gotten, holds that the State of Washington, claiming by
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has a building resting partly on his own land and partly over his boun-
dary on his neighbor's land will "possess" a walkway or approach area
for access to the building,117 though there apparently would be no
possession of such an area if no part of his building touched his neigh-
bor's land.1 s There is possession of parts of land used in connection
with areas upon which improvements or crops have been put if there
is "control and dominion" over the undeveloped areas.119
Examples of actual possession. The thought presents itself that,
since possession is a question of fact, it might aid understanding of the
subject matter to offer examples of factual situations. To that end,
precis of selected cases in which the court has dealt with the facts in
detail will be listed.
The following acts have been held to establish possession of rural
land: Building a fence and cultivating or pasturing, or both, up to it; 2 '
clearing land, constructing and occupying buildings, and planting orch-
ards;12 clearing, draining, fencing, and cultivating; 22 clearing, fenc-
ing, planting an orchard, and building a road; 123 farming, pasturing,
planting an orchard, and building irrigation ditches;124 maintenance
by the state of structures and lesser improvements in an area used as
a park;1 25 maintaining fishnets and equipment in season, driving pil-
ings, and defending the area, underwater tidelands, against trespass-
adverse possession an area of Gingko State Park, "possessed" an area which must
have amounted to several acres around buildings and other improvements it had put
by mistake on another's land.11 7 Skoog v. Seymour, 29 Wn.2d 355, 187 P.2d 304 (1947).1 1 8 Mourik v. Adams, 47 Wn.2d 278, 287 P.2d 320 (1955) (house was about one
foot from line for over ten years, but not certain claimant had had door opening out
on that side for ten years).
119 Alexander v. Bennett, 91 Wash. 688, 158 Pac. 534 (1916) (where claimant main-
tained crops in field near lake, he also "possessed" fringe of shoreland around field
which was logically connected with field, though not itself arable) ; Olson v. Howard,
38 Wash. 15, 80 Pac. 170 (1905) (claimant, who resided on part of parcel of land, also
"possessed" connected portion over which he had "control and dominion").
1.20 Faubion v. Elder, 49 Wn.2d 300, 301 P.2d 153 (1956) ; Taylor v. Talmadge, 45
Wn.2d 144, 273 P.2d 506 (1954); Young v. Newbro, 32 Wn.2d 141, 200 P.2d 975(1948); Jackman v. Germain, 96 Wash. 415, 165 Pac. 78 (1917); Alexander v. Ben-
nett, 91 Wash. 688, 158 Pac. 534 (1916) ; Wisinger v. Reed, 69 Wash. 684, 125 Pac.
1030 (1912).
121 Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 122 Wash. 514, 210 Pac. 770 (1922);
Kirchhoffer v. Harris, 68 Wash. 316, 123 Pac. 455 (1912) ; Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25
Wash. 14, 64 Pac. 936 (1901).
.22 Kent v. Holderman, 140 Wash. 353, 248 Pac. 882 (1926).
123 Davies v. Wickstrom, 56 Wash. 154, 105 Pac. 454 (1909).2 4 Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Bailey, 160 Wash. 663, 295 Pac. 943 (1931). See
also State v. Ballard, 156 Wash. 530, 287 Pac. 27 (1930), which held fencing, farming,
and building an irrigation ditch constituted "possession" of a railroad right of way
easement.
125 State v. Stockdale, 34 Wn.2d 857, 210 P.2d 686 (1949).
128 Grays Harbor Commercial Co. v. McCulloch, 113 Wash. 203, 193 Pac. 709
(1920).
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ers; 6 and flooding another's land by maintaining a dam."'
The following acts have been held to establish possession of city
lots: Erecting a fence or wall, constructing one or more buildings on
another's land in reference to such fence, and maintaining a lawn and
shrubbery up to it (cases cited vary slightly on facts);12' building a
fence, grading land, and planting a hedge and trees in reference to the
fence;.12  fencing, building a house, and residing on the land;... build-
ing a house, constructing a bulkhead against the sea, and digging a
well.''
The following acts have been held not to establish possession of
rural or semi-rural land: Allowing the erection and maintenance of one,
and part of the time two, advertising signboards;. 2 irregular use for
gardening, piling wood, and mowing hay;"' maintaining an irregular
"fence" of poles and brush, taking timber, and once planting cab-
bages; " occasionally using uplands fronting on Puget Sound tidelands
for picnics and putting on them a sign warning against beach fires;
and exacting rent from the owner's tenant in possession."'
The following acts have been held not to establish possession of city
lots: Keeping a lot cleared for over ten years and maintaining a fence
for less than ten years;"I clearing, grading, gardening, and fencing
three sides of a lot situated in a sparsely populated edge of a city;" 8
and according to dictum in one case, fencing, planting scattered trees
and bushes, and irregular cultivation of small gardens."'
A unique opportunity to study the question of possession under al-
127 Mclnnis v. Day Lumber Co., 102 Wash. 38, 172 Pac. 844 (1918) (case does not
decide whether use described in text gave title by adverse possession or easement by
adverse use).
12" Skoog v. Seymour, 29 Wn.2d 355, 187 P.2d 304 (1947) ; Foote v. Kearney, 157
Wash. 681, 290 P.2d 226 (1930) ; Weingarten v. Shurtleff, 51 Wash. 602, 99 Pac. 739
(1909) ; Flint v. Long, 12 Wash. 342, 41 Pac. 49 (1895).
12 Thornely v. Andrews, 45 Wash. 413, 88 Pac. 757 (1907).
130 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Concannon, 75 Wash. 591, 135 Pac. 652 (1913), reversed
on other grounds, 239 U.S. 382 (1915).
1"1 Bowden-Gazzam Co. v. Kent, 22 Wn.2d 41, 154 P.2d 292 (1944).
12 Slater v. Murphy, 154 Wash. Dec. 250, 339 P.2d 457 (1959). As this is written,
there is a petition for rehearing pending on this case, an issue being made on whether
the acts done constituted adverse possession.
"1' Smith v. Chambers, 112 Wash. 600, 192 Pac. 891 (1920).
1"4 White v. Branchick, 160 Wash. 697, 295 Pac. 929 (1931).
135 Harkins v. Del Pozzi, 50 Wn.2d 237, 310 P.2d 532 (1957).
13 Threlkeld v. Conway, 121 Wash. 624, 209 Pac. 1088 (1922).
1"7 Loomis v. Stromburg, 166 Wash. 567, 7 P.2d 973 (1932).
1's Peoples Say. Bank v. Bufford, 90 Wash. 204, 155 Pac. 1068 (1916). This case,
which has been cited a number of times in subsequent cases, presents a fact situation
worth studying, because it is probably very close to the line between what is and what
is not "possession."
"39 Spinning v. Pugh, 65 Wash. 490, 118 Pac. 635 (1911) (dictum because acts not
carried on for ten years).
[VOL. 35
ADVERSE POSSESSION
most laboratory-like conditions can be had by comparing the first case
of Booten v. Peterson4 0 with the second case of the same name.' On
the first appeal it was held that there was no possession of land in a lot
used for a home on the Hood Canal by the acts of clearing, running a
single-strand fence from tree to tree, and maintaining a croquet court.
In the second appeal, after remand and a retrial, it was held that when,
added to these acts, there also was evidence that the disputed area
had been used every weekend in the summers for camping and that the
owner had acquiesced in the claimant's doing of all the acts, there was
possession. One instructive point of the second case is that, while the
owner's knowledge of or acquiescence in another's claim to his land
does not give the other possession, it does seem to swell acts of posses-
sion which are present.
UNINTERRUPTED AND EXCLUSIVE
Uninterrupted. Cases which recite the elements for adverse posses-
sion invariably say it must be uninterrupted or continuous for the limi-
tations period. During this period, that is to say, before title is per-
fected, as compared with after title is perfected, abandonment by the
adverse possessor or re-entry by the owner will break the continuity.
The period of adverse possession up to the break is then lost and cannot
be added onto the time of a second period if adverse possession is re-
sumed after a hiatus.'42
Apparently there need be no very long break to end a period of ad-
verse possession, especially when there is a re-entry by the owner. In
one such case a re-entry of five days seems to have been sufficient." 3
Even where the owner made no re-entry, the adverse possessor's selling
his improvements to a third person and leaving the premises for several
months broke the chain. "' In another case the removal of trees and
shrubs, the planting of which were the visible evidence of adverse
possession, for about two years produced the same result,"'
Exclusive. To be in adverse possession the possessor must have
exclusive possession. This does not mean he cannot possess through
those claiming under him, such as tenants, because, as has already been
seen, that is quite possible. Rather, it means for one thing that the pos-
140 34 Wn.2d 563, 209 P2d 349 (1949).
141 Booten v. Peterson, 47 Wn2d 565, 288 P2d 1084 (1955).
'42 For an application of this, see George v. Columbia & P. S. R. R., 38 Wash.
480, 80 Pac. 767 (1905).
14 Ibid.
144 Johnson v. Brown, 33 Wash. 588, 74 Pac. 677 (1903).
5 Noyes v. Douglas, 39 Wash. 314, 81 Pac. 724 (1905).
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session and use must be different from and greater than that of the pub-
lic in general. 4 ' This indicates of course that the public could not get
title to land by adverse possession and that no large group of persons
would be apt to do so. There are no Washington cases, but Tiffany says
it is possible for adverse possession by occupants claiming as co-ten-
ants.'47
Probably the most meaningful application of the requirement of
exclusive possession is that the adverse possessor cannot share occupa-
tion with the true owner. 4 ' This rests upon the basis that in law posses-
sion is exclusive by its nature, and the owner, if on the land, can alone
have it.
OPEN AND NOTORIOUS
Open. All recitations of the requisites of adverse possession
contain the elements "open and notorious." No Washington case
seems to have dealt with "open" by itself, and it is doubtful that it
exists as a separate element. A fantastic case might be imagined in
which the possessor kept hidden or camouflaged objects on the land
or carried out possessory acts by night, but in such a case the occupa-
tion would not be notorious to the owner, as well as not being open.
This suggests that "open" is a redundant expression of something
which is of the same quality, though not even as strong, as "notorious."
Notorious. "Notorious" means that, for possession to be adverse, it
must be such as to give actual or constructive notice of its existence to
the landowner. Certainly it is enough if the owner has actual knowledge
of that fact. 4" This is not necessary, however, if the acts of possession
are such as to charge a reasonable man in the owner's position with
notice of adverse possession. 50 Involving as it does the aspect of the
"reasonable man," the element of notoriousness amounts to more of a
test for whether possession is "adverse" than it does of an element in
its own right. In several cases the court has used it as a test in deciding
that possession either was'.' or was not 52 adverse. Notoriousness is
146 Moon v. Tumwater Paper Mills Co., 157 Wash. 453, 289 Pac. 24 (1930) ; Turner
v. Ladd, 42 Wash. 274, 84 Pac. 866 (1906) (semble).
147 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 423 (1939).
148 Scott v. Slater, 42 Wn.2d 366, 255 P.2d 377 (1953) (adverse claimant used dis-
puted area across boundary line, but owner used it also).
149 McAuliff v. Parker, 10 Wash. 141, 38 Pac. 744 (1894).
150 Davies v. Wickstrom, 56 Wash. 154, 105 Pac. 454 (1909).
15.1 Kent v. Holderman, 140 Wash. 353, 248 Pac. 882 (1926) ; Davies v. Wickstrom,
op. cit. supra note 150.
152 Downie v. City of Renton, 167 Wash. 374. 9 P.2d 372, reversing, 162 Wash. 181,
298 Pac. 454 (1932) ; Murray v. Bousquet, 154 Wash. 42, 280 Pac. 935 (1929) ; Nether-
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so interwoven with the elements of "actual possession" and "hostile"
that it hardly can be viewed alone.
HosTIE AND CLAM OF RIGHT
Hostility is the very marrow of adverse possession under any of the
statutes except of course the vacant land statute. Unfortunately it is
also a matted and tangled jungle into which litigants enter, never to
emerge. The trouble is not too few pathways but too many, for the
area abounds in highly conceptual ideas bordering on the metaphysi-
cal and fine distinctions followed by only the most perspicacious or,
more likely, credulous. It is, in short, an area of shadows and much
shadow boxing.
General aspects of hostility. To say that possession, to be adverse,
must be "hostile" does not import enmity or ill will but only means
that the possessor occupies another's land in the manner a true owner
would and in particular that he does not occupy it in a manner sub-
servient to the owner. 5' It will be perceived that this sweeps in a good
deal of "actual possession" and of "open and notorious." The real heart
of the matter, though, is that hostility is the opposite of permissiveness.
Probably the most useful test of hostility was stated in Peoples Say.
Bank v. Bufford,'" where it was in substance stated thus: Considering
the character of possession and the locale of the land, is the possession
of such a nature as would normally be objectionable to owners of such
land?
Claim of right. Many cases, including those under the ten-year
statute as well as the color-of-title and connected-title statutes, recite
that possession must be under "claim or right" to be adverse. This
article takes the position that "claim of right" is the same as "hostile."
It is true that some cases.. seem to treat it as a separate element,
though none actually says it is different from hostility. It also may be
that a misconception of claim of right is responsible for some of the
lands American Mortgage Bank v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber Co., 142 Wash. 204, 252
Pac. 916 (1927) ; Daniel v. Daniel, 106 Wash. 660, 181 Pac. 215 (1919) ; Peoples Say.
Bank v. Bufford, 90 Wash. 204, 155 Pac. 1068 (1916).
'r Fisher v. Hagstrom, 35 Wn2d 632, 214 P.2d 654 (1950) ; Bowden-Gazzam Co.
v. Hogan, 22 Wn.2d 27, 154 P.2d 285 (1944) ; Nixon v. Merchant, 19 Wn.2d 97, 141
P.2d 411 (1943) ; Roesch v. Gerst, 18 Wn.2d 294, 138 P.2d 846 (1943) ; Mittet v Han-
sen, 178 Wash. 541, 35 P.2d 93 (1934); King v. Bassindale, 127 Wash. 189, 220 Pac.
777 (1923) ; Cameron v. Bustard, 119 Wash. 266, 205 Pac. 385 (1922).
1"90 Wash. 204, 155 Pac. 1068 (1916).
155 Williamson v. Horton, 157 Wash. 621, 289 Pac. 1025 (1930) ; Miller v. O'Leary,
44 Wash. 172, 87 Pac. 113 (1906); Hesser v. Siepmann, 35 Wash. 14, 76 Pac. 295
(1904) ; Kline v. Stein, 30 Wash. 189, 70 Pac. 235 (1902) ; Bowers v. Ledgerwood,
25 Wash. 14, 64 Pac. 936 (1901).
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difficulties to be discussed later in the subsections on "subjective intent"
and "mistake." However, as early as 1901 the court said claim of
right was shown by acts of possession such as a true owner would do," 6
which is the usual description of hostility. Since then the court has
stated flatly that the two elements are the same. Bowden-Gazzam Co.
v. Hogan,"7 perhaps the leading adverse possession case in Washing-
ton, so states, adding that both of the elements simply mean the posses-
sor acts as an owner would and does not recognize superior title. Sev-
eral other cases, both before and after the Hogan case, have said the
same thing.'
Hostile possession is non-permissive. Possession will not be hostile
and will not be adverse if it is by the owner's permission given to the
possessor." 9 But a narrow distinction is made between permission,
which will prevent hostility, and mere knowledge and acquiescence by
the owner, which will not. That is, if the owner knows of the possession
and allows it because he believes the possessor is actually the owner,
the possession will be hostile.'
Possession will be permissive if, during the period for which he claims
adverse possession, the possessor leases the land from the owner.'
Permissiveness may also be found in asking the owner's permission to
grant easements to third parties"' or even in litigating to get title.Y3
On the other hand, buying a tax delinquency certificate does not ac-
knowledge superior title or prevent hostility.'
An odd group of cases which may fit in at this point are the "squat-
ter" cases. The court tends rather to label than to define a "squatter"
and, when he has been labeled, to deny him adverse possession. It may
be said in general-and nothing much can be said in particular-that
a "squatter" is one who resides in a shack, perhaps intermittently, and
who makes no extensive use of the land. "Squatters" seem to be found
156 Bowers v. Ledgerwood, op. cit. supra note 155.
15722 Wn.2d 27, 154 P.2d 285 (1944).
158 Fisher v. Hagstrom, 35 Wn.2d 632, 214 P.2d 654 (1950) ; Nixon v. Merchant,
19 Wn.2d 97, 141 P.2d 411 (1943); Roesch v. Gerst, 18 Wn.2d 294, 138 P.2d 846(1943) ; Cameron v. Bustard, 119 Wash. 266, 205 Pac. 385 (1922).
119 On this point generally see Price v. Humptulips Driving Co., 116 Wash. 56,
198 Pac. 374 (1921) (prescriptive easement case) ; and O'Connell v. McCool, 89 Wash.
537, 154 Pac. 1090 (1916).
160 Hovila v. Bartek, 48 Wn.2d 238, 292 P.2d 877 (1956) ; Booten v. Peterson, 47
Wn.2d 565, 288 Pac. 1084 (1955).161 Bowden-Gazzam Co. v. Kent, 22 Wn.2d 41, 154 P.2d 292 (1944); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. George, 51 Wash. 303, 98 Pac. 1126 (1908).
162 O'Donnell v. McCool, 89 Wash. 537, 154 Pac. 1090 (1916).
163 City of Port Townsend v. Lewis, 34 Wash. 413, 75 Pac. 982 (1904).
164 Silverstone v. Hanley, 55 Wash. 458, 104 Pac. 767 (1909).
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along the periphery of undeveloped land, such as railroad tracks6 ' or
sparsely settled areas near towns.166 Apparently the theory is that
where squatters are common, their presence is so normal and so unob-
jectionable to the owner as to be presumed to be by his permission.
Happily, with unsettled areas of the state becoming fewer, there do not
seem to have been any recent "squatter" cases.
A specialized application of permissive possession appears in mis-
taken boundary cases where one neighbor possesses a strip of adjoining
land. If the neighbors have agreed, at a time when they are not sure
of their mutual boundary, that they will use up to a chosen line for
convenience until the true line is fixed by survey, then whichever one
turns out to be using his neighbor's land will not be doing so adverse-
ly.287 The cases have not generally analyzed why this is so, but it
clearly rests upon the theory that there is mutual permission by both
neighbors. If confined to this situation, the result is sound enough. Un-
fortunately this particular fact pattern seems to have been confused at
times with essentially different patterns occurring in the mistaken boun-
dary area, and the court may have on occasion found an "agreement"
on nebulous facts. 6 '
A close relationship between possessor and owner may imply per-
missiveness and militates against the element of hostility but does not
always prevent it. Where a woman entered land with the permission
and invitation of her daughter and son-in-law, maintained cordial rela-
tions with them, and lived part of the time at their home on the other
land, her possession was held permissive. 6 ' The same result was reached
where the owner's son and other relatives lived on land upon which
they allowed the owner to pay taxes and insurance and make repairs.7 0
However, adverse possession has been allowed recently where the dis-
seisor and disseisee were brother and sister.Y
Must original entry be hostile? It was once stated and apparently
held that unless the original entry is hostile there can be no adverse
possession.Y However, later cases have probably modified this case.
'
6 5 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Devine, 53 Wash. 241, 101 Pac. 841 (1909).
166 Blake v. Shriver, 27 Wash, 593, 68 Pac. 330 (1902).
167 Beck v. Loveland, 37 Wn.2d 249, 222 P.2d 1066 (1950); Lindberg v. Davis,
164 Wash. 680, 4 P.2d 501 (1931) ; Davis v. Kenney, 131 Wash. 168, 229 Pac. 311(1924); Wilcox v. Smith, 38 Wash. 585, 80 Pac. 803 (1905) ; Phinney v. Campbell,
16 Wash. 203, 47 Pac. 502 (1896).
s6 8 For a discussion of mistaken boundaries in general, see Comment, Boundar
Disputes in Washington, 23 WASH. L. Rav. 125 (1948).
169 Schmitz v. Klee, 103 Wash. 9, 173 Pac. 1026 (1918).
.70 Santmeyer v. Clemmancs, 147 Wash. 354, 266 Pac. 148 (1928).
'171 Faubion v. Elder, 49 Wn.2d 300, 301 P.2d 153 (1956).
172 McNaught-Collins Improvement Co. v. May, 52 Wash. 632, 101 Pac. 237 (1909)
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In one 7' adverse possession was held to have existed for a number of
years, though there was apparently nothing at all shown as to the
character or even time of original entry. The court's reasoning seems
to have been that disseisin does not require a hostile entry, because
adverse possession itself is disseisin. Another case,' 4 one involving
prescriptive easements, though not finding a non-permissive use, says
that it is possible for an originally permissive entry to become adverse
if there is an assertion of hostility brought to the owner's attention.
This is consistent with cases already dealt with in which adverse posses-
sion has been allowed between tenants in common' 5 and between ven-
dor and vendee.' 6 These cases, speaking of acts which are an "ouster,"
have certainly held adverse possession is possible when the original
entry was permissive. Therefore, the rule should be that permissive
possession can become hostile if the possessor does or says things un-
mistakably to show a holding inconsistent with the permission origi-
nally given.
Subjective intent. The effect of the would-be adverse possessor's
subjective intent upon his claim is the most troublesome problem in all
adverse possession. There are apparently some conflicting cases here,
though, strange as it seems, this assertion is made with timorousness,
because the shadings are so fine as to defy analysis in some instances.
As used in the cases, "intent" usually partakes of the possessor's belief
as to whether the land is or is not his own, though it is possible to intend
to possess land whether or not there is a belief it is owned. Understood
in any of these ways, the term denotes a subjective quality of the pos-
sessor's mind. It should not be used to refer to the dispossessed owner's
thinking or to an interchange of ideas between disseisor and disseisee,
the latter being properly "permissiveness" or "agreement." Cases have
not always kept these ideal concepts well separated, adding to the re-
searcher's dismay.
Why subjective intent should even be a part of adverse possession is
unclear, but apparently it arises from connotations attaching to the
word "claim" in "claim of right." Inasmuch as the position in Wash-
ington seems to be that "claim of right" is the same thing as "hostile"'7 7
(when original entry was made, land was owned by Government, against which there
could be no adverse possession, but continuing possession, apparently adverse in char-
acter, was maintained for over ten years against purchaser from Government).
173 Foote v. Kearney, 157 Wash. 681, 290 Pac. 226 (1930).
174 Roediger v. Cullen, 26 Wn.2d 690, 175 P.2d 669 (1946).
175 See cases cited in footnotes 50 and 51, .ntpra.
176 See footnote 55, .supra, and its textual referent.
177 See cases cited in footnotes 156, 157, and 158, supra, and textual referents to
those footnotes.
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it is somewhat inconsistent to derive a separate meaning from "claim
of right." It is for this reason that "subjective intent" is here treated
under its own heading.
A number of cases have held that a subjective intent by the possessor
not to possess or acquire another's land-negative intent-will prevent
adverse possession, though the other elements are present. Thus, in
Brown v. Hubbard,7 ' a mistaken boundary case, the possessor's claim
to title by adverse possession was defeated by this testimony: " 'No. I
wouldn't take her property, had I known it.' """7 Similar cases have
held in mistaken boundary situations that the possessor possessing up
to a fence or wall on his neighbor's land does not get title by adverse
possession up to that line if his subjective intent is to use up to it only
until the true line can be set."' Variations occur when the possessor
enters unsurveyed land with the intent not to possess such parts as a
survey may show to be another's 8' or where possession of previously
vacant land is with the intent not to remain after the owner enters."8 2
In neither situation is there adverse possession. Another line of cases
have inferred negative intent from events which have happened after
the ten-year limitations period has run, as where a building maintained
upon another's land was torn down when it was found to encroach'
or where one who had bought another's land, less mineral rights,
here claimed to have previously acquired the entire fee by adverse
possession.8 4 In the well-known case of Skansi v. Novak,,8 the court
seems to have been willing to infer that the claimant intended not to
own a disputed strip from the mere fact that he knew where his true
178 42 Wn.2d 867, 259 P._d 391 (1953).
3", Id. at 869.
%80 Julien v. Herren, 149 Wash. 573, 271 Pac. 891 (1928) ; Noyes v. Douglas, 39
Wash. 314, 81 Pac. 724 (1905) ; Wilcox v. Smith, 38 Wash. 585, 80 Pac. 803 (1905).
181 Suksdorf v. Humphrey, 36 Wash. 1, 77 Pac. 1071 (1904).
1
8 2 Lohse v. Burch, 42 Wash. 156, 84 Pac. 722 (1906) ; Blake v. Shriver, 27 Wash.
593, 68 Pac. 330 (1902). Both cases are somewhat unclear, because there are a number
of factors present, and the court seemed to regard the occupants as "squatters." The
reasoning appears to be that a squatter intends not to remain after the owner enters.
18sMilbank v. Rowland, 63 Wash. 519, 115 Pac. 1053 (1911). From 1894 to 1904
the possessor's building encroached on his neighbor's lot. In 1904, apparently after the
ten-year period, he discovered this fact and removed it. Later when he claimed to
have acquired the disputed strip by adverse possession, the court inferred from his
removing the building that he had never intended to own any land not his.
184 Morgan v. Northern Pac. Ry., 50 Wash. 480, 97 Pac. 510 (1908). The claimant
had been in non-permissive possession of another's land and had erected substantial
improvements from 1883 to 1899. He then paid for and got a deed, in which the grantor
reserved mineral rights. Later, after coal was discovered, claimant asserted he had
been in adverse possession before 1899, but the court held otherwise, inferring from his
acknowledging the true owner by purchase in 1899 that he always intended no adverse
claim.
185 84 Wash. 39, 146 Pac. 160 (1915).
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property line was and supposed this was as far as he owned, though
he had put a home, boathouse, and pier on the disputed strip." 6
Another specialized application of the "negative intent" rule occurs
where the possessor of land actually belonging to a private person
believes by mistake that it belongs to the state or Government. In 1893
the original case on this point, Moore v. Brownfield,'87 held that fact
would not prevent adverse possession. But that portion of that case
was overruled by McNaught-Collins Improvement Co. v. May, 8'
which reasoned that, since adverse possession could not be had against
the state or Government, a possessor believing one of them owned the
land must have intended not to possess adversely at all and that this
would prevent adverse possession against the whole world. This
attenuated reasoning has not done much for the clarity of the law, but
it has been followed by at least one case 88 and is probably at least an
alternate ground for the result in Skansi v. Novak,' discussed supra.
Moreover, the same reasoning explains the result of a case 9' handed
down before the McNaugkt-Collins case, though the court attempted to
harmonize Moore v. Brownfield.
There is a direct split of authority on the question of negative intent,
inasmuch as Mittet v. Hansen'9 said and held that a subjective intent
not to claim more land than the adverse claimant owned did not pre-
vent adverse possession. The case seems contrary to the above cases on
negative intent and further seems to reach a result opposite to Brown
v. Hubbard, supra, on nearly identical facts.
The next question is, for adverse possession does the possessor have
to have a belief he is the true owner or an intent to possess or acquire
another's land-an affirmative intent? Here is a jungle so tangled and
matted that, not only do litigants enter and never emerge, but also
this article, while it must emerge, cannot say where it has been. In
1953 in Brown v. Hubbard,9 ' the court, though probably holding only
that negative intent defeated adverse possession, said, quoting in part
from an earlier case: "'The mere possession of land beyond the real
186 There may be an alternate ground for the result of this case. See footnote 190,
infra, and its textual referent.
187 7 Wash. 23, 34 Pac. 199 (1893). Followed in Johnson v. Conner, 48 Wash. 431,
93 Pac. 914 (1908).
188 52 Wash. 632, 101 Pac. 237 (1909).
189 State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 135 Pac. 1035 (1913).
190 84 Wash. 39, 146 Pac. 160 (1915).
'91 Yesler Estate v. Holmes, 39 Wash. 34, 80 Pac. 851 (1905).
192 178 Wash. 541, 35 P.2d 93 (1934). In a mistaken boundary case, the adverse
claimant testified he had no intention of claiming more land than to the true boundary.
The court held this was not inconsistent with his claim to a strip of his neighbor's land.
193 42 Wn.2d 867, 259 P.2d 391 (1953).
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boundary line is not sufficient to make such holding adverse. There
must be, in addition to that, an intention to claim title to the disputed
area and to hold as the owner' [Italics ours.]" ''  This seems to call
for an affirmative intent to hold as the owner, and several subsequent
cases show judges through the state so understood."' But in 1954 in
O'Brien v. Schultz,.90 the court denied that affirmative subjective intent
had ever been required and attempted to harmonize a number of prior
cases, including Brown v. Hubbard, supra, and Skansi v. Novak. 9 In
substance the O'Brien case also stated that, though intention was
required, it was generally inferred from the possessor's acts and that
only where the acts were equivocal would a statement of no intent to
possess another's land defeat adverse possession 98 Since the O'Brien
case, while cases have cited it several times, Brown v. Hubbard has been
ignored, and "intent" has been inferred from the possessor's acts.'99 In
fact, Niven v. Sheehan00 holds that no subjective'affirmative intent is
required.
Still, O'Brien v. Schultz, though it may be hoped to lay at rest the
question of affirmative intent, does not come to grips with many cases
involving negative intent-the intent not to own. The O'Brien case
attempts to reconcile Brown v. Hubbard and Mittet v. Hansen and
says an express declaration of negative intent will defeat adverse pos-
194 Id. at 869.
195 See in particular Niven v. Sheehan, 46 Wn.2d 152, 278 P.2d 784 (1955), and
O'Brien v. Schultz, 45 Wn.2d 769, 278 P.2d 322 (1954).
190 Op. cit. supra, note 195.
197 84 Wash. 39, 146 Pac. 160 (1915).
10s "On the contrary, we had on several occasions, prior to the Brown iv. Hubbard]
and Beck [v. Loveland] cases, held that at express declaration of intention to claim
land adversely to the true owner is not necessary to initiate the running of the statu-
tory period nor to support an action to establish title by adverse possession." O'Brien
v. Schultz, 45 Wn.2d 769, 778, 278 P.2d 322 (1954). "Courts have had considerable
difficulty in determining 'intention' in adverse possession cases, because intention may
be evidenced (1) by the acts, of a party, or (2) by his declarations ... In jurisdictions
such as ours, the acts of the user most frequently control. If his acts clearly evince an
intention to claim land as its owner, a general declaration by the user that he did not
intend to claim another's land will not prove lack of intention. .. . But a specific
declaration by a user that he knew a fence was not a boundary and that he agreed to
consider it as a temporary barrier will prove lack of intention. Beck v. Loveland,
supra. [The court in this last sentence is speaking of an agreement between neighbors,
which denotes permissive use rather than the unilateral intent of of the possessor.]
And if his acts are equivocal or do not clearly evince his intention to claim as owner,
his declaration that he did not intend to take another's land, though not conclusive
proof of lack of intention, may be considered in determining his intention while using
the land. Brown v. Hubbard, supra. .. ." O'Brien v. Schultz, supra at 780.
199 Buchanan v. Cassell, 53 Wn.2d 611, 335 P.2d 600 (1959); Malnati v. Ramstead,
50 Wn.2d 105, 309 P.2d 754 (1957) (pipeline easement case); Faubion v. Elder, 49
Wn.2d 300, 301 P.2d 153 (1956) ; Niven v. Sheehan, 46 Wn.2d 152, 278 P.2d 784(1955).
209 Op. cit. supra, note 195.
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session only where his possessory acts are "equivocal." 0' 1 Yet, in
Skansi v. Novak, supra, in a number of other cases cited in the discus-
sion on negative intent,0 2 and possibly even in Brown v. Hubbard,
supra, there were permanent improvements made by the possessors,
and in all except the Brown case there was no express declaration at
all. But the court was willing to infer from various kinds of circum-
stances a negative intent which overcame acts so substantial that they
could hardly be termed "equivocal." So the O'Brien case, if it has
brought peace to the affirmative intent problem, has only muddied the
already murky waters of negative intent.
Perhaps the reader will agree that the law would have been clearer
and in the long run more useful to the people if Washington had never
gone into the "subjective intent" business at all. All, or perhaps even
most, states have, and the common law of England seems to have, had
no such element to adverse possession.02 Adverse possession revolves
around the character of possession, and it is difficult to see why a man's
secret thoughts should have anything to do with it. Maybe the idea
criginated in a confusion of permission or agreement between owner
and possessor with unilateral intent in the possessor's mind. Whatever
the reason, the court could yet perform a service by doing away with
any requirement of subjective intent, negative or affirmative. Since a
man cannot by thoughts alone put himself in adverse possession, why
should he be able to think himself out of it?
Mistake. Though often occurring in connection with subjective in-
tent and though sometimes confused with it, mistake is not intent.
Intent is what a man thinks-a subjective emotion. Mistake is simply
the quality of these thoughts being incorrect and is judged purely by
objective standards.
In adverse possession "mistake" is nearly synonymous with mis-
taken boundary cases, of which there are many. In a typical case the
possessor will occupy up to a fence, wall or hedge on what he mistak-
enly supposes to be his boundary line with his neighbor. Thirty cases
could be cited as holding that, provided the other elements of adverse
possession are present, a mistake as to the true ownership will not pre-
vent adverse possession. Typical ones span the years from 1959 back
to 1901.204
201 See quotation from O'Brien case, op. cit. supra note 198.
202 See for example Millbank v. Rowland, 63 Wash. 519, 115 Pac. 1053 (1911), cited
in footnote 183, and Morgan v. Northern Pac. Ry., 50 Wash. 480, 97 Pac. 510 (1908),
cited in footnote 184.
203 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1147 (1939).
204 Buchanan v. Cassell, 53 Wn.2d 611, 335 P.2d 600 (1959) ; Faubion v. Elder, 49
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A few aspects peculiar to mistaken boundary cases, though perhaps
in strict logic belonging elsewhere, will be discussed here for conveni-
ence. It usually happens that there is a fence or wall, though in special
circumstances this is not necessary if a well-defined line is otherwise
present.05 If claim is made up to a fence, it should follow a regular
line, because if it does not, this is evidence that it was not regarded as
a line fence."' It seems that the one claiming by adverse possession
must introduce evidence showing he or his predecessors treated and
regarded the fence as a line fence for the period of limitations. 0 If a
fence is not maintained as a line fence but for some other purpose, such
as to regulate cattle, this infers it was for convenience only and that
the possession up to it was permissive.0
The Washington court has developed a doctrine in connection with
mistaken boundaries which, though many times a substitute for adverse
possession, is not adverse possession. A line of cases which apparently
date back to Egleski v. Strozyk00 in 1922 announce that if neighbors
set a boundary fence or wall, expressly agree it is their boundary, and
maintain the condition for ten years, the line set becomes the boundary,
regardless of whether it was correct. By use of this doctrine it is pos-
sible in some circumstances to avoid having to prove all the elements
necessary to establish adverse possession.
COLOR OF TITLE
"Color of title" is expressly required under both the color-of-title
and vacant-land statutes. Under the connected-title statute there is a
similar requirement, but this will be treated in a separate section.
As put succinctly in Bassett v. City of Spokane,21° "color of title is
that which is a semblance or appearance of title, but is not title in fact
nor in law." Thus, it is a document, on its face appearing to carry title,
Wn.2d 300, 301 P.2d 153 (1956); Niven v. Sheehan, 46 Wn2d 152, 278 P.2d 784
(1955) ; Taylor v. Talmadge, 45 Wn.2d 144, 273 P.2d 506 (1954) ; Eubanks v. Buckley
16 Wn.2d 24, 132 P.2d 353 (1942) ; Alverson v. Hooper, 108 Wash. 510, 185 Pac. 808
(1919) ; Naher v. Farmer, 60 Wash. 600, 111 Pac. 768 (1910) ; Schlossmacher v. Bea-
con Place Co., 52 Wash. 588, 100 Pac. 1013 (1909) ; Erickson v. Murlin, 39 Wash. 43,
80 Pac. 853 (1905) ; Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14, 64 Pac. 936 (1901).
200 Skoog v. Seymour, 29 Wn.2d 355, 187 P2d 304 (1947).
200 Scott v. Slater, 42 Wn.2d 366, 255 P.2d 377 (1953) ; Lappenbusch v. Florkow,
175 Wash. 23, 26 P.2d 388 (1933) ; White v. Branchick, 160 Wash. 697, 295 Pac. 929
(1931) (alternate basis for result).
207 Cabe v. Halverson, 48 Wn.2d 172, 292 P2d 220 (1956).
208 Hawk v. Walthew, 184 Wash. 673, 52 P2d 1258 (1936).
209 121 Wash. 398, 209 Pac. 708 (1922). See on this subject Comment, Boundary
Disputes in Washington, 23 WAsH. L. REV. 125 (1948).
210 98 Wash. 654, 168 Pac. 478 (1917), affirming, 93 Wash. 413, 161 Pac. 65 (1916).
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but actually void. A sheriff's certificate of sale alone21' or certificate
of sale and sheriff's deed212 are color of title, though void because of
some defect in the sale 1' or the action out of which it arose 4 and
even though unrecorded. 15 So is a void tax sale deed,216 but a certifi-
cate of delinquent taxes is not.21 ' A void administrator's1 8 or guar-
dian's 219 deed provides color of title, as also does a deed to community
property executed by the husband alone.22 One case held that, once
color of title was acquired, it was not destroyed by a foreclosure action
in rem against the land, though the case said such an action in perso-
nam against the person who was the source of the colorable title would
have destroyed it.22' And it has been held several times that when
adverse possession is claimed under color of title, the land adversely
possessed can be no larger than that described in the colorable title
documents.222
Nothing in the ten-year statute mentions color of title, but a number
of older cases under it recite that possession to be adverse "must be
under color of title or claim of right. 22 Even under such statements
color of title would be only an alternative requirement,and it has been
held no color of title is required under the ten-year statute if there is a
claim of right. 4 As a practical matter, no one seems to have claimed
adverse possession with color of title under the ten-year statute, which
is understandable in view of the shorter limitation period of the color-
of-title statute. At any rate, the latest case2 under the ten-year stat-
ute does not mention color of title at all, and neither do other recent
211 Prentice v. How, 84 Wash. 136, 146 Pac. 388 (1915) ; Goetter v. Moore, 53
Wash. 5, 101 Pac. 365 (1909) ; Olson v. Howard, 38 Wash. 15, 80 Pac. 170 (1905)
Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Palmer, 32 Wash. 455, 73 Pac. 501 (1903).
212 Johnson v. Bartlett, 50 Wash. 114, 96 Pac. 833 (1908) ; Cox v. Tompkinson, 39
Wash. 70, 80 Pac. 1005 (1905).
21s Johnson v. Bartlett, op. cit. supra note 212.
214 Cox v. Tompkinson, 39 Wash. 70, 80 Pac. 1005 (1905).
215 Goetter v. Moore, 53 Wash. 5, 101 Pac. 365 (1909).
216 Lara v. Sandell, 52 Wash. 53, 100 Pac. 166 (1909).
217 Flueck v. Pedigo, 55 Wash. 646, 104 Pac. 1119 (1909).
218 Mary M. Miller & Sons v. Simmons, 67 Wash. 294, 121 Pac. 462 (1912).
219 Hamilton v. Witner, 50 Wash. 689, 97 Pac. 1084 (1908).
220 Biggart v. Evans, 36 Wash. 212, 78 Pac. 925 (1904).
221 Bassett v. City of Spokane, 98 Wash. 654, 168 Pac. 478 (1917), affiring, 93
Wash. 413, 161 Pac. 65 (1916).
222 Harkins v. Del Pozzi, 50 Wn.2d 237, 310 P.2d 532 (1957) ; State v. Scott, 89
Wash. 63, 154 Pac. 165 (1916) (alternate holding) ; Snell v. Stelling, 83 Wash. 248,
145 Pac. 466 (1915). See also Schmitz v. Klee, 103 Wash. 9, 173 Pac. 1026 (1918),
which says, though it may be dictum, that extrinsic evidence cannot be resorted to to
show the area covered by a colorable title document.
223 See for instance McNaught-Collins Improvement Co. v. May, 52 Wash. 632,
101 Pac. 237 (1909).
224 Williamson v. Horton, 157 Wash. 621, 289 Pac. 1025 (1930).
225 Slater v. Murphy, 154 Wash. Dec. 250, 339 P.2d 457 (1959).
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cases. 28 Whether the court may later lapse back into its older habit is
interesting speculation but, based upon the fact that nothing much
turned upon color of title under the ten-year statute, mainly academic.
GooD FAiTH
Color-of-title and vacant-land statutes. Both the color-of-title and
vacant-land statutes require "color-of-title made in good faith." As
used in these statutes, "good faith" seems to mean that the adverse
claimant, has an honest belief that his colorable title document is genu-
ine, though a paucity of cases makes generalizations difficult. It seems
certain that his actual knowledge that someone else is the true record
owner will prevent good faith."' And, though it is not clear on the
point, one case seems to say there is no good faith if the colorable docu-
ment is received from a person who then has pending against him an
action to contest his legal right to the land.2 There is, however, dic-
tum in a case that notice of another's claim of interest, which the ad-
verse claimant in good faith believes to be ill founded, does not destroy
good faith. 29
Ten-year statute. Though the ten-year statute makes no require-
ment of good faith, decisional law has injected one, possibly, which is
undecipherable, probably. Nothing in the law of adverse possession in
Washington, not even the question of subjective intent discussed in an
earlier part of the article, is so wholly at odds with itself and, appar-
ently, with the law of other jurisdictions.30
The early Washington cases do not seem to have stated any require-
ment of good faith under the ten-year statute.2"' But in 1909, in Ramsey
226 E.xamples are Taylor v. Talmadge, 45 Wn.2d 144, 273 P2d 506 (1954), and
Scott v. Slater, 42 Wn.2d 366, 255 P2d 377 (1953), from which Slater v. Murphy,
Ibid., took its language. An earlier case to the same effect is Bowden-Gazzam Co. v.
Kent, 22 Wn.2d 41, 154 P.2d 292 (1944), which quoted from Roesch v. Gerst 18 Wn.2d
294, 138 P.2d 846 (1943), which may be the source of the language currently in use.227 Petticrew v. Greenshields, 61 Wash. 614, 112 Pac. 749 (1911); Brodack v.
Morsbach, 38 Wash. 72, 80 Pac. 275 (1905). See also McDowell v. Beckham, 72 Wash.
224, 130 Pac. 350 (1913) (probably dictum).
228 May v. Sutherlin, 41 Wash. 609, 84 Pac. 585 (1906). It seems from the facts
given in the opinion tbat the recipient of the document bad no actual knowledge of the
pendency of the action against his grantor. If not, then the court must have found
constructive knowledge from the public record of the action's being brought (there
was no lis pendens filed in it).229 Brodack v. Morsbach, 38 Wash. 72, 80 Pac. 275 (1905).
230 The chapter on adverse possession in 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 403-543 (1939),
does not mention the existence elsewhere of a doctrine such as that Washington has
worked dut.
231 See statements of requirements for adverse possession in Erickson v. Murlin,
39 Wash. 43, 80 Pac. 853 (1905), Yesler Estate v. Holmes, 39 Wash. 34, 80 Pac. 851(1905), and Bowers v. Ledgerwood, 25 Wash. 14, 64 Pac. 936 (1901). In Flint v.
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v. Wilson," there was what appears to be a holding that possession had
to be begun in good faith to ripen into title under the ten-year statute.
In Skansi v. Novak in 1915 it was said that there had to be a "claim of
right made in good faith." ' 3 The most recent case under the ten-year
statute234 and other ones upon which it relies. 3 speak of a "claim" or
"claim of right" in good faith. The thing to be emphasized first is that,
whereas under the color-of-title and vacant-land statutes there is a re-
quirement of color of title in good faith, under the ten-year statute the
court says it is imposing a requirement that "claim of right" be in good
faith. As seen earlier, "claim of right" is the same as "hostile," and
both mean the adverse possessor possesses as a true owner would. This
is of course the heart of adverse possession, and the court is thus saying
that under the ten-year statute the adverse possession itself must be in
good faith.
There is a worse problem yet. It is not even certain the court means
what it says about good faith. State v. Stockdale, a 1949 case,"' though
reciting a requirement of good faith, allowed title by adverse possession
where the possessor knew it did not own the land occupied, had been
informed by the true owner of his ownership, and had negotiated with
him to purchase the disputed area. The important case of Bowden-
Gazzam Co. v. Hogan237 held there was adverse possession where the
possessor knew he did not own the land but believed he would acquire
title by adverse possession if he occupied it ten years.
Possibly Ramsey v. Wilson, supra, could be reconciled with the
Stockdale and Hogan cases if the rule were stated to be that there is
good faith if the possessor knows someone else is the owner but no good
faith if he knows who that owner is. A better and happier solution
would be for the Ramsey case to be overruled. Better yet, good faith
could be forgotten entirely as far as the ten-year statute goes.
Long, 12 Wash. 342, 41 Pac. 49 (1895), the court conceded arguendo the necessity of
color of title in good faith under the ten-year statute but expressly refused to pass
upon the question.
232 52 Wash. 111, 100 Pac. 177 (1909). The possessor knew title was in the state
when he entered. Possibly the court was developing the doctrine of McNaught-Collins
Improvement Co. v. May, 52 Wash. 632, 101 Pac. 237 (1909), which is that there is a
subjective intent not to possess adversely if the possessor believes the land belongs to
the state or the Government. The results of the Ramsey and McNaught-Collins cases
are the same, but in Ramsey the court professes to go on the theory of no good faith.
233 84 Wash. 39, 44-45, 146 Pac. 160.
234 Slater v. Murphy, 154 Wash. Dec. 250, 339 P.2d 457 (1959).
235 See for example Taylor v. Talmadge, 45 Wn.2d 144, 273 P.2d 506 (1954), and
Scott v. Slater, 42 Wn.2d 366, 255 P.2d 377 (1953).
23634 Wn.2d 857, 210 P.2d 686 (1949).
23T 22 Wn.2d 27, 154 P.2d 285 (1944).
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PAYMENT OF TAXEs
Payment of taxes for seven consecutive years is required under the
color-of-title and vacant-land statutes only. Neither of these statutes
will begin running until the first tax payment is made, not necessarily
from the date of assessment."8 Taxes must be paid each of the seven
years as they come due, not later after they are delinquent.8 If, by
mistake, the state assesses two persons for taxes on the same land, one
of them is not paying "all taxes legally assessed," as required by both
statutes. 4 ' And finally, where the interests in land are divided between
surface and mineral rights but the state assesses only the surface owner,
his payment of taxes is not payment of taxes on the mineral rights for
purposes of adverse possession.241
CONNECTED TITLE
The so-called "connected title," that is, title deducible of record
back to the state or United States, is required only under the connected-
title statute, RCW 7.28.050, which is fairly explicit. This statute will
begin running only when the possessor acquires title or takes possession,
whichever is later.242 A void sheriff's certificate of sale and deed are
"connected title."214 And a void state deed is sufficient for this purpose,
even if the federal Government had also issued a patent to the same
land.24'
VACANT LAND
Of course the question of what is "vacant land" arises only under the
vacant-land statute, RCW 7.28.080, which terms it "vacant and un-
occupied land." There are few cases at all under this statute, and only
one has been found construing the words quoted. It holds that land used
for logging and having a lumber camp on a portion of it was not vacant
land.24 Another case on a different point holds that where there is
seven years total payment of taxes, part of the time while the land is
vacant and part of it while the land was occupied in conformity to the
288 Tremmel v. Mess, 46 Wash. 137, 89 Pac. 487 (1907).
239 Brownstin v. Brelle, 193 Wash. 553, 76 P2d 613 (1938) ; Kennedy v. Anderson,
88 Wash. 457, 153 Pac. 319 (1915) ; Seymour v. Dufur, 53 Wash. 646, 102 Pac. 756
(1909).
240 Grays Harbor Commercial Co. v. McCulloch, 113 Wash. 203, 193 Pac. 709
(1920).241 McCoy v. Lowrie, 42 Wn2d 24, 253 P.2d 415 (1953).242 Krutz v. Isaacs, 25 Wash. 566, 66 Pac. 141 (1901).
243 Schlarb v. Castaing, 50 Wash. 331, 97 Pac. 289 (1908).244Aspinwall v. Allen, 144 Wash. 198, 257 Pac. 631 (1927) ; Grays Harbor Com-
mercial Co. v. McCulloch, 113 Wash. 203, 193 Pac. 709 (1920).2
-5 McCoy v. Lowrie, 42 Wn.2d 24, 253 P.2d 415 (1953).
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color-of-title statute, title is perfected by adding the times of the two
statutes together.248
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS
For the most part, the law of adverse possession is applicable to the
obtaining of easements by the adverse use of another's land for ten
years. Essentially, the difference between the two doctrines is that in
the one there is actual possession and in the other only use. Because
by definition none of the other statutes discussed here are applicable to
adverse use, only the ten-year one is involved. Cases under it are freely
cited back and forth as authority for both adverse possession and use,
and a number of adverse use cases have already been cited in this
article. Therefore, only a brief sketch of some of the salient points or
peculiar quirks of prescriptive easements will be noted here.
Most often the easement gained by prescription is one of passage,
but it is possible to gain other kinds, such as for a pipeline247 or ditch, 4 '
the nature of the easement always conforming to the nature of use.
Once an easement has been acquired by prescription, it is the same as
an easement by grant and is protectable by enjoining the owner of the
servient estate from interfering with its use.24
One of the difficult areas in the law of prescriptive easements con-
cerns the acquisition vel non of ways of passage across unenclosed and
unoccupied land. Even with enclosed land, the use of a pathway with-
out permission does not alone create a presumption such use is adverse,
and the hostility must be separately proven."' Rather, the presumption
still remains that the use was "permissive," as the word is used in ad-
verse possession. The presumption is nigh impregnable when the unen-
closed and unoccupied land is involved. It is probably the rule that the
public cannot get an easement of passage across unenclosed land by
traveling upon it alone,2 ' though most of the cases also seem to rely
upon the fact that the travel was intermittent 52 or that there was not
sufficient notice to the owner of a hostile claim.25 However, it is not
240 Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Palmer, 32 Wash. 455, 73 Pac. 501(1903).
247 Malnati v. Ramstead, 50 Wn.2d 105, 309 P.2d 754 (1957).
248 Ochfen v. Kominsky, 121 Wash. 60, 207 Pac. 1050 (1922).
249 Ochfen v. Kominsky, op. cit. supra note 248.
250 Roediger v. Cullen, 26 Wn.2d 690, 175 P.2d 669 (1946).
251 Stevens County v. Burrus, 180 Wash. 420, 40 P.2d 125 (1935), seems to say this
flatly.
252 Turner v. Davisson, 47 Wn.2d 375, 287 P.2d 726 (1955); Lewis v. City of
Seattle, 174 Wash. 219, 24 P.2d 427, aff'd on rehearing, 174 Wash. 226, 27 P.2d 1119
(1933).
252 State ex rel. Shorett v. Blue Ridge Club, 22 Wn.2d 487, 156 P.2d 667 (1945).
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impossible for a private person at least to acquire a prescriptive ease-
ment for a pipeline and for a pathway used in connection with it across
unenclosed and unoccupied land.254
The reader who wishes a fuller background on the subject of pre-
scriptive easements will find the cases cited in this section helpful, since
most are leading cases. Another case which has a full-dress review of
the doctrine and of other cases is Northwest Cities Gas Co. v. Western
Fuel Co.,2 5 which is something of a classic.
25- Manati v. Ramstead, 50 Wn.Zd 105, 309 P.2d 754 (1957).25s13 Wn.2d 75, 123 P.2d 771 (1942).
19601
